# How $951 Bought a $8.5M Vote: The Term Finance Governance Exploit

**URL:** <https://forums.sui.io/t/how-951-bought-a-8-5m-vote-the-term-finance-governance-exploit/49424>\
**Category:** General\
**Tags:** feature\
**Created:** [August 27, 2026, 1:57am UTC](https://forums.sui.io/t/how-951-bought-a-8-5m-vote-the-term-finance-governance-exploit/49424 "2026-08-27T01:57:10Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![mehvetero](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/sui/user_avatar/forums.sui.io/mehvetero/32/31742_2.png) [@mehvetero](https://forums.sui.io/u/mehvetero)\
**Post date:** [August 27, 2026, 1:57am UTC](https://forums.sui.io/t/how-951-bought-a-8-5m-vote-the-term-finance-governance-exploit/49424/1 "2026-08-27T01:57:10Z")

</div>

_\*Zero bugs. Zero hacks. Just a vote.\*_

On August 23, 2026, at 06:25 UTC, an attacker executed a single parameterless function call on Ethereum and walked away with $8.5 million from Term Finance’s vaults. No exploit in the traditional sense — no reentrancy, no overflow, no oracle manipulation. The smart contracts worked exactly as designed. The attacker simply voted.

This is the anatomy of a governance takeover — the kind of attack that no code audit would have caught, because the code was never the problem.

all read → mehvetero[.]com

 ![term](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/sui/original/3X/1/7/1795114f6ba958963d767258bace1f87fbc3de5e.jpeg)